Distinguishing byproducts from non-adaptive effects of algorithmic adaptations by Park, Justin H.
  
 University of Groningen






IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2007
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Park, J. H. (2007). Distinguishing byproducts from non-adaptive effects of algorithmic adaptations.
Evolutionary Psychology, 5(1), 47 - 51. https://doi.org/10.1177/147470490700500105
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Evolutionary Psychology  




Distinguishing Byproducts from Non-Adaptive Effects of Algorithmic 
Adaptations 
Justin H. Park, Department of Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands. Email: 
j.h.park@rug.nl 
Abstract: I evaluate the use of the byproduct concept in psychology, particularly the 
adaptation–byproduct distinction that is commonly invoked in discussions of psychological 
phenomena.  This distinction can be problematic when investigating algorithmic 
mechanisms and their effects, because although all byproducts may be functionless 
concomitants of adaptations, not all incidental effects of algorithmic adaptations are 
byproducts (although they have sometimes been labeled as such).  I call attention to 
Sperber’s (1994) distinction between proper domains and actual domains of algorithmic 
mechanisms.  Extending Sperber’s distinction, I propose the terms adaptive effects and 
non-adaptive effects, which more accurately capture the phenomena of interest to 
psychologists and prevent fruitless adaptation-versus-byproduct debates. 
Keywords:  algorithmic adaptation, byproduct, actual domain, proper domain, adaptive 
effect, non-adaptive effect. 
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Introduction 
The adaptation concept has been immensely useful in psychology.  Theories and 
hypotheses derived from adaptationist thinking have produced an abundance of discoveries 
that have filled several recent edited volumes (e.g., Buss, 2005; Dunbar and Barrett, 2007; 
Schaller, Simpson, and Kenrick, 2006).  The byproduct concept, despite being the focus of 
substantial discussion and exposition (e.g., Andrews, Gangestad, and Matthews, 2002; 
Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, and Wakefield, 1998; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, and 
Chance, 2002), has been far less useful, at least with respect to empirical yield.  Moreover, 
as I show below, the concept has sometimes been applied in a manner inconsistent with its 
definition.  In this article, I evaluate the use of the byproduct concept in psychology—
particularly the associated idea that commonly investigated psychological phenomena can 
be categorized as either adaptations or byproducts.  I argue that the adaptation–byproduct 
distinction often fails to capture the distinction of interest to psychologists, and I advocate 
the use of another distinction based on Sperber (1994). 
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Discussion 
What is wrong with the adaptation–byproduct distinction?  First, what is a 
byproduct? According to established definition, a byproduct is a trait that evolved “not 
because it was selectively advantageous, but because it was inextricably linked (either 
through pleiotropy or linkage disequilibrium) to another trait that was reproductively 
advantageous” (Andrews et al., 2002, p. 491; for a similar definition, see Buss et al., 1998).  
A commonly invoked analogy for byproducts is architectural spandrels, which are spaces 
that are necessarily left between designed features of buildings (Buss et al., 1998; Gould, 
1997).  There are several examples of biological byproducts that clearly conform to this 
definition, such as the whiteness of bone and the belly button—these features evolved, are 
functionless, and are inextricably linked to an adaptation (i.e., white bones are necessary 
effects of selecting for bone made of calcium). 
A number of evolutionary psychologists have applied the adaptation–byproduct 
distinction by asking questions of the form “Is X an adaptation, or is it a byproduct of an 
adaptation?” where X represents phenomena such as automatic encoding of race or rape 
(e.g., Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides, 2001; Thornhill and Palmer, 2000).  According to 
Kurzban et al., humans possess adaptations for tracking coalitional alliances, which are 
sensitive to a variety of information suggesting group membership.  In modern contexts 
consisting of racially diverse individuals, race-related physical features may (incorrectly) 
be perceived as cues for coalitional alliances, resulting in the automatic encoding of race.  
Kurzban et al. went on to show that automatic encoding of race can be eliminated by 
modifying contextual circumstances.  Therefore, they concluded, the tendency to 
automatically encode race is a byproduct, not an adaptation. 
That conclusion, however, depends on a looser, more colloquial use of the term 
‘byproduct.’  Although encoding race may indeed be an incidental effect of an adaptation 
for tracking coalitional alliances, it is not an evolved feature and is demonstrably not 
inextricably linked to this adaptation—it is just one possible effect in one possible social 
milieu.  The confusion arises because (1) the term byproduct has been used in a different 
manner and (2) effects of functional algorithms have been conflated with the algorithmic 
mechanisms themselves.  Unlike structural traits—such as bones and umbilical cords—
behavioral ‘traits’ that many psychologists tend to investigate are information-processing 
algorithms that take in specific stimuli as input and produce specific psychological or 
behavioral responses as output. 
As shown in Figure 1, a psychological adaptation designed to detect coalitional 
alliances consists of a functional algorithmic component that detects cues that potentially 
signal coalitional alliances and translates those cues into quick categorization of the social 
world.  In different social contexts, this algorithmic mechanism may detect a range of 
coalition-connoting cues (some diagnostic, others not) and produce a response (some 
functional, others not).  The functional component of this adaptation is the algorithmic 
mechanism (depicted in the box in Figure 1).  Thus, one can claim to have identified a 
byproduct of this adaptation only when one has identified some evolved feature that is 
inextricably linked to this algorithmic mechanism.  The various effects of this algorithmic 
adaptation—whether they are adaptive effects or incidental effects—are not properly the 
focus of the adaptation-versus-byproduct debate, because they logically cannot be either.  
Therefore, asking whether encoding race is an adaptation or a byproduct is misleading. 
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Figure 1. A schematic diagram of coalitional-alliance detection adaptation, which detects a 
range of stimuli (some diagnostic, others not) and translates them into specific responses 
(some functional, others not), a pattern that is characteristic of many algorithmic 
adaptations.    
 
 
As another example, Thornhill and Palmer (2000) asked whether rape is an 
adaptation or a byproduct of other adaptations—specifically, men’s desire for sex and 
tendency to use violence in pursuit of a goal.  The authors were undecided, but for the 
moment, suppose that rape is not an adaptation, but is an incidental effect of these other 
adaptations; that is, given some environmental conditions, these adaptations sometimes 
produce effects that lead to rape.  Then, rape would represent just one possible effect of 
these adaptations in a given circumstance.  And as it would not represent an evolved feature 
that is inextricably linked to those adaptations, it should not be labeled a byproduct.  
Indeed, given the multiplicity of psychological mechanisms that may underlie and 
contribute to rape, the adaptation-versus-byproduct dichotomy may have been too 
simplistic to begin with (Pinker, 2002). 
If in fact phenomena such as automatic encoding of race and rape are neither 
adaptations nor byproducts, what are they?  Sperber (1994) offered a distinction that is less 
known than the adaptation–byproduct distinction, but is perhaps more useful for 
psychologists.  He noted that algorithmic mechanisms (those that detect specific stimuli 
and produce specific responses) can be said to have proper domains and actual domains.  
The coalition-alliance detecting mechanism evolved in response to various indicators of 
coalitional alliances—for example, “patterns of coordinated action, cooperation, and 
competition” (Kurzban et al., 2001, p. 15387); these cues constitute the proper domain of 
this adaptive mechanism.  However, once in place, this mechanism may potentially respond 
to a wider range of cues, such as team sports jerseys and race-related physical features, 
regardless of whether these cues existed ancestrally or are diagnostic of coalitional 
alliances; these cues constitute the actual domain of this adaptive mechanism. 
Extending Sperber’s (1994) distinction, I propose a distinction between adaptive 
effects (e.g., responding to ancestrally existing “proper” cues) and non-adaptive effects 
(e.g., responding to evolutionarily novel “actual” cues).  Then, automatic encoding of race 
can be characterized as a non-adaptive effect of the coalition-alliance detecting adaptation.  
The distinction isn’t perfect, because one could argue that some evolutionarily novel, ‘non-
proper’ cues—such as sports team jerseys—are actually diagnostic of coalitional alliances 
and produce what appear to be ‘adaptive’ effects.  Nevertheless, this distinction prevents 
misuse of the byproduct concept and forces one to be more explicit about adaptive 
components of algorithmic mechanisms and their effects.  This is beneficial, because a 
clear separation of algorithmic adaptations from their effects can prevent awkward 
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conclusions such as that a coalition-alliance detecting adaptation, in the case of encoding 
race has transformed into a byproduct (of course, the underlying adaptation has remained 
unchanged and no real byproduct has been identified). 
An important point for psychologists (especially those interested in algorithmic 
stimulus–response mechanisms) is this:  Not all psychological phenomena qualify for the 
adaptation-versus-byproduct debate.  The adaptation–byproduct distinction does not neatly 
“carve nature at its joints” when investigating the nature and consequences of adaptive 
algorithmic mechanisms.  Several psychological phenomena—the tendency to overeat, the 
tendency to stigmatize unusual-looking people, the tendency to react prosocially toward 
facially similar (but unrelated) others, and the tendency to find unrelated housemates 
sexually aversive—can be understood as incidental effects of algorithmic adaptations (e.g., 
DeBruine, 2005; Park, Faulkner, and Schaller, 2003; Pinel, Assanand, and Lehman, 2000; 
Shepher, 1971).  But asking whether these phenomena are adaptations or byproducts would 
have missed the point, as they are neither; they are all effects of normally operating 
algorithmic adaptations. 
Conclusions 
In sum, when applying evolutionary reasoning to algorithmic psychological 
processes, one must first separate the adaptive components (e.g., coalition-alliance 
detecting mechanisms) from their effects (e.g., automatic encoding of race).  Then, one 
should attempt to identify the design features of the mechanism (including the 
identification of the proper domain of the mechanism), which will then lead to hypotheses 
about how the mechanism may operate in novel circumstances, producing various adaptive 
and non-adaptive effects. 
Does this mean that the byproduct concept is useless in the study of algorithmic 
adaptations?  That remains an empirical issue.  It’s possible that there are true byproducts 
of algorithmic adaptations yet to be identified.  In the meantime, we should be mindful of 
our terminology so that we can recognize a real byproduct when we see one. 
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